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Abstract
The purpose of the paper is to provide a simple model explaining buyer-supplier
relationships and show what factors determine the number of trading partners. We
show that when the supplier is able to determine the number of trading partners, the
optimal number is small if the supplier's bargaining power with them is weak, the
economy of scope in the supplier's variable costs is signi¯cant, and that in its sunk
investment is weak. Investment may be greater when the number of trading partners
is small. The results may be consistent with the formation of Japanese buyer-supplier
relations.
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I Introduction
Manufacturers have sought the optimal number of buyers, which a®ects revenues from
customers and manufacturers' ¯xed/variable costs including labor, material, and invest-
ment. For instance, in the context of patent licensing, licensors determine the number
of licensees (Kamien and Tauman (1986) and Kamien et al. (1992)).1 In the context of
buyer-suppler relations, suppliers consider whether strategies with broader customer scope
lead to superior performance (Nobeoka et al. (2002)). In fact, in the Toyota keiretsu group
(recognized as among the tightest), 41.7 percent of its a±liated ¯rms (de¯ned here as those
that are more than 20 percent owned by Toyota) sold 40{80 percent of their products to
outsiders (Sato (1988, p. 121) and Nishiguchi (1994, p. 115)). This fact implies that some
suppliers choose a broader customer scope, while others choose a narrower scope. In other
words, taking into account their technological environments, including the values of their
products, production e±ciencies, and investment capabilities, suppliers choose their opti-
mal number of customers. We therefore investigate what factors determine the number of
trading partners (the customer scope).
We provide a simple model to explain the strategies of suppliers. The setting is as
follows. Consider a situation in which there is one supplier and two buyers. The supplier
can provide a good that is used by the two buyers. However, the buyers cannot produce
the good on their own. In this situation, the supplier ¯rst decides with whom to negotiate.
Second, the supplier invests to improve the value of the good for the buyer(s) and at this
stage decides the amount of investment. The investment cost is sunk before the next stage.
The (additional) sunk investment cost for the second buyer (the second unit of the good)
is smaller than that for the ¯rst buyer. Third, there are negotiations between the supplier
and the buyer(s) who were designated by the supplier in the ¯rst stage. In this stage, we
apply a simple Nash bargaining approach used by Chipty and Snyder (1999) and Raskovich
1 Kamien and Tauman (1986) and Kamien et al. (1992) and subsequent researchers investigate how a
(monopolistic) patent holder determines the number of licensees that compete in ¯nal product markets.
Downstream competition is an essential factor in the adoption of exclusive licensing o®ers for the licensees
in those papers.
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(2003).2 The characteristic of this approach is that if the supplier chooses to bargain with
two buyers in the ¯rst stage, the supplier and each buyer conduct simultaneously and
separately the Nash bargaining. The supplier only provides and sells the good to the
buyer if its variable production cost is covered as a result of the bargaining. When the
supplier produces the good for the buyer(s), it incurs a variable production cost. The
(additional) variable production cost for the second buyer is smaller than that for the ¯rst
buyer.
We show several results that may be consistent with the formation of Japanese buyer{
supplier relations.3 When the supplier is able to determine the number of trading partners|
one or two|the optimal number is one for the supplier if the supplier's bargaining power
with its trading partners is weak, and the supplier's additional sunk investment cost is
relatively large. The supplier prefers to trade with one buyer if the variable production
cost is neither large nor small relative to the value of the good. In other words, when
the supplier's variable production cost is small, it should have broader relationships with
partners. As the product e±ciency of the supplier improves, the performance (payo®) of
the supplier becomes higher because of the higher investment level caused by the broader
customer scope. This seems consistent with the ¯nding in Nobeoka et al. (2002): a
broader customer scope strategy should result in superior performance, primarily because
of superior learning opportunities. We also show that the equilibrium investment level
when the supplier trades with one buyer can be larger than with two buyers if the sunk
investment cost is large relative to the value of the good, the supplier's bargaining power
with its trading partners is weak, and the variable production cost is large.4 This may
2 For theoretical discussions of bargaining solutions, see, for instance, Binmore et al. (1986), Chae and
Yang (1994), Krishna and Serrano (1996), and Okada (1996, 2010).
3 Konishi et al. (1996) formulate a bargaining model of buyer{seller relationships from the buyer's
viewpoint. Their purpose is to provide an alternative solution for the hold-up problems, in contrast to
the vertical integration approach advocated by Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990).
Although their model provides a plausible explanation why typical auto assemblers in Japan do not ver-
tically integrate with a single part supplier but transact with two potentially competitive suppliers, they
do not explain suppliers' decisions concerning the number of buyers.
4 The outcome in this paper (a narrower customer scope) may evoke the term \exclusive dealing,"
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also be consistent with the following ¯nding. Japanese automakers and their suppliers
are more specialized than their US counterparts, and there is a high correlation between
supplier specialization and automaker pro¯tability (Dyer (1996)). Although this state-
ment is based on the viewpoint of buyers (automakers), the correlation may be because
the higher investment levels caused by the narrower customer scope of suppliers leads to
higher pro¯tability of the automakers.
This paper is closely related to those of Chipty and Snyder (1999) and Raskovich
(2003).5 However, to analyze a buyer{supplier relation with cooperative investments, we
add two new elements to these papers. One is the supplier's decision regarding the number
of buyers, and the other is the supplier's investment to improve the quality of the buyers'
products. Inderst and Wey's (2003) study is also closely related to ours. They discuss
how the equilibrium market structure is determined in a bilateral oligopoly with choice of
technology. Although they comprehensively discuss bargaining, mergers, and technology
choice in simple bilateral oligopolistic markets, they do not discuss the relation between
bargaining power and equilibrium market structure (the number of trading partners) as
our paper does.
This paper is also related to literature on the source of buyer power.6 The model
structure in this paper is related to those in Battigalli et al. (2007) and Inderst and Wey
(2007, 2010). Those papers discuss situations in which a monopoly upstream supplier sells
an input to downstream ¯rms (buyers) and engages in quality-enhancing/cost-reducing
investments. The number of buyers is exogenously ¯xed in those papers.
This paper is relevant to the literature on the hold-up problem because in our model
the supplier's investment is not fully compensated by the buyers (a classic form of \hold-
although the main concern is quite di®erent from those in the literature on exclusive dealing. Several
papers discuss whether exclusive contracts foster relationship-speci¯c investment by an incumbent supplier
(e.g., Segal and Whinston (2000) and de Meza and Selvaggi (2007)). They discuss whether the exclusion
of potential suppliers enhances the incentive of the incumbent supplier to invest.
5 Stole and Zwiebel's (1996a, b) study is also relevant to the discussion in Chipty and Snyder (1999).
6 Inderst and Mazzarotto (2008) and Inderst and Sha®er (2007) provide surveys in discussions of buyer
power. Rey and Tirole (2007) provide a comprehensive survey of vertical relations.
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up"). The literature mainly discusses ways to overcome the hold-up problem (e.g., Klein
et al. (1978) and Williamson (1979)) and examines a pair of buyers and sellers in isolation,
whereas this paper considers the hold-up problem in a situation with multiple buyers.7
This study is also relevant to studies of buyer and seller networks. While there are
many papers discussing buyer{seller networks (e.g., Kranton and Minehart (2000, 2001))
that compare vertically integrated ¯rms and networks of manufacturers and suppliers, the
purpose of this paper is di®erent.8 Although in most of these papers product quality is
exogenously given, we discuss quality investment by the upstream supplier who anticipates
subsequent negotiations between the buyers.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model.
Section 3 presents the result of the basic model. Section 4 incorporates the investment
decision of the supplier into the basic model. Section 5 discusses the buyers' incentive for
a horizontal merger. Section 6 investigates whether an exclusive incumbent buyer allows
a monopoly supplier to expand the customer scope of the supplier when the incumbent
buyer contracts exclusively with the monopoly supplier. Section 7 concludes.
II A simple model
We consider a situation in which there is one supplier and two potential buyers (buyers
1 and 2). For example, in the case of the automobile industry, the supplier corresponds
to an auto parts manufacturer and the buyers correspond to automotive manufacturers.
The supplier can produce a good and sell it to the buyers. Although the buyers need one
7 The other methods are changing ownership structure (e.g., Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and
Moore (1990), and Aghion and Bolton (1992)) and contractual solutions (e.g., Chung (1991) and Aghion
et al. (1994)). Che and Hausch (1999), however, showed that when investments have a cooperative
nature (e.g., the seller's investment improves the buyer's valuation of the good), contracting has no value
if the contract must remain subject to renegotiation (see also Hart and Moore (1999) and Segal (1999)).
This paper also concerns cooperation, because the supplier's investment improves the quality of buyers'
products.
8 Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) and Bala and Goyal (2000) provided formal models of network formation.
Belle°amme and Bloch (2004), Billand and Bravard (2004), Goyal and Joshi (2006), and Furusawa and
Konishi (2007) applied the theory to the models of oligopoly.
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unit of the good, they cannot produce it on their own, and therefore must buy it from the
supplier.
We model the negotiation between the supplier and the buyers as the following two-
stage game. In the ¯rst stage, the supplier decides with whom to negotiate. In the second
stage, the supplier and the buyers designated in the ¯rst stage negotiate. If the negotiation
is successful, the supplier produces the good and sells it to the buyer. Otherwise, the good
is not provided and the buyer obtains nothing.
We now explain the details of the two stages. In the ¯rst stage, if there is one negotia-
tion partner, the cost of the investments for production is F , and if there are two, this cost
is dF where d 2 [1; 2]. This investment cost is assumed to be sunk; that is, the supplier
cannot recover the cost in the second stage. This assumption means that the per-buyer
(sunk) investment cost is smaller when the supplier trades with two partners than with
only one, and that the investment cost is related to several kinds of sunk set-up costs; for
instance, designing a large plant to manufacture the inputs of partners, conducting basic
surveys to build it and building ¯rm-speci¯c facilities to make the inputs.
In the second stage, we consider a form of bilateral and simultaneous negotiation. If
the supplier negotiates with two buyers, then it enters into simultaneous bargaining with
each of the two buyers separately.9 Bargaining determines whether one unit of the good is
provided and the amount of money the buyer transfers to the supplier. Each bargaining
session, if successful, provides one unit of the good. The cost of providing the good is c
if one unit of the good is produced, and (a + 1)c if two are produced, where a 2 [0; 1]
and this cost is not sunk. These assumptions mean that the per-buyer production cost is
smaller when the supplier trades with two partners than with only one, and is related to
9 We have to mention two remarks about the assumption. First, this assumption implies that each pair
of the supplier and a buyer bilaterally negotiate the amount of payment after the product characteristic is
determined. In the Japanese buyer-supplier relationships, Asanuma (1985) observes that parts prices are
revised at regular intervals, by bilateral negotiation, incorporating both risk and incentives for innovation
and e®ort. We think that the assumptions about the timing structure and the negotiation procedure
capture this stylized fact in Asanuma (1985). Second, some may assume that our results depend on the
simultaneous bargaining procedure. Fortunately, the results of sequential bargaining are similar to those
of simultaneous bargaining and are available in Appendix 2.
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several variable costs, such as material, labor, and natural resources.10
Payo®s to the supplier and the two buyers are determined as follows. Let v denote the
(gross) value of each buyer for the good. If buyer i obtains the good and pays Ti, then it
receives the payo® v ¡ Ti. Otherwise, its payo® is zero.11 When the supplier negotiates
with the two buyers, the supplier's payo® is T1 + T2 ¡ (a + 1)c ¡ dF if it successfully
negotiates with buyers 1 and 2, Ti ¡ c ¡ dF if it succeeds only in the negotiation with
buyer i (i = 1; 2), and ¡dF if none of the bargaining is successful. When the supplier
negotiates with one buyer, the supplier's payo® is Ti ¡ c ¡ F if bargaining is successful
and ¡F otherwise.
We assume that the outcome of the second stage is determined as follows.12
1. The outcome of each negotiation is given by the Nash bargaining solution in the
belief that the outcome of bargaining with the other party is determined in the same
way.
2. The joint surplus is divided between the buyer and the supplier in the proportion of
1¡ ¯ to ¯, in which ¯ 2 (0; 1) represents the bargaining power of the supplier, and
the supplier has the advantage over the buyer if and only if ¯ > 1=2.
In this model, there is an externality in bargaining. Although each bargaining session
decides whether one unit of the good is produced so as to maximize joint surplus, the cost
of providing the good depends on the outcome of the bargaining with the other party. The
cost of the good is ac if the other negotiation is successful, and c otherwise. Thus, the
10 If prices of some widgets needed to produce the buyer's inputs depend on the following functional
form, the assumption that a 2 [0; 1] is reasonable: F=Q + w, where F (> 0) and w(> 0) are exogenous
parameters and Q is the quantity demanded by the supplier. That price schedule is often called quantity
discount (Jeuland and Shugan (1983)). The price schedule is equivalent to the case in which the total
payment for widgets is equal to F + wQ (= Q£ (F=Q+ w)), the so-called \two-part tari®."
11 This payo® form of buyers implicitly assumes that the buyers' demand for the good is inelastic. This
assumption is to simplify the analysis.
12 We follow the bargaining procedures in Raskovich (2003). A di®erent approach, building on the
Shapley value, has been used, for instance, in Inderst and Wey (2003) and de Fontenay and Gans (2005,
2007).
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joint surplus of each bargaining session varies according to the belief about the bargaining
with the other ¯rm. Note that according to this assumption, the two participants in each
bargaining session (the supplier and one buyer) believe that the other bargaining session
is conducted e±ciently, and this belief is justi¯ed in equilibrium.13
Remarks We have implicitly assumed that the supplier cannot supply more than two
buyers. This constraint re°ects technological di±culties of the suppliers. For instance,
using a common platform, Nissan (a major Japanese automobile manufacturer) produces
two brands of cars (CUBE and MARCH). It is not easy, however, for Nissan to make
a new type of car under the common platform because it restricts the car's design, size,
drivability, and so on.14 Therefore, we consider that the implicit assumption is reasonable.
We have also implicitly assumed that only two buyers exist. This assumption implies that
the supplier would have di±culty in ¯nding a new buyer. Small suppliers often face such
a di±culty due to a shortage of information about potential buyers. Moreover, trade
frictions can cause thin trade networks among buyers and suppliers (Mahoney (2001) and
Chatain and Zemsky (2009)). We have also assumed that the supplier does not trade
with new buyers when it has decided to trade with only one. Once the supplier incurs
a sunk investment cost of production for one buyer, it has di±culty changing production
factors, such as size, design, and process. Moreover, the supplier faces a time constraint
that impedes the expansion of its production capacity. For instance, small and medium-
sized technology-based enterprises can hardly compete in volume, because they may not
have su±cient resources to expand production capacity swiftly (Qian and Li (2003)). We
implicitly assume that the supplier forgoes the opportunity to sell the right to obtain
the good. This implies that a buyer cannot buy out the supplier. Small ¯rms are often
13 The assumption that each participant in a bargaining session believes that bargaining with the other
party is conducted e±ciently is essential to our result. In another bargaining procedure, such as the
Shapley bargaining, we may not obtain the same results. This is available in Appendix 3.
14 Some researchers also point out that this kind of component sharing has a trade-o®: the bene¯t is
a reduction in the cost of designing and purchasing additional components, but the cost is an increase in
mismatch costs associated with using existing components with excess capability (Fisher et al. (1999),
Ramdas and Sawhney (2001), Ramdas and Randall (2008)).
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organized by owners who have speci¯c skills in production. In other words, technicians
manage their own ¯rms. Those self-managing technicians may have an intrinsic motivation
to operate their ¯rms. They may also like the privilege of determining when they work
and what they produce. Those factors would discourage the suppliers/technicians from
selling their ¯rms.
III Analysis
We solve the two-stage model using backward induction. First, we calculate the Nash
bargaining outcomes of the second stage. Second, we consider the ¯rst stage and examine
the number of buyers with whom it is optimal for the supplier to negotiate.
III(i) The second stage
We need to consider the following two cases: the supplier negotiating with only one buyer,
and with two buyers.
III(i).1 Negotiation with one supplier and one buyer
If the supplier decided to negotiate with one buyer, then the surplus of this negotiation is
v¡ c. Let T denote a payment from the buyer to the supplier. The buyer and the supplier
split the surplus in a way that satis¯es v ¡ T : T ¡ c = 1¡ ¯ : ¯. Therefore, we obtain
¯[v ¡ T ] = (1¡ ¯)(T ¡ c) or To := ¯v + (1¡ ¯)c:
Then, the pro¯t of the supplier is
¼¤1 = To ¡ c¡ F = ¯(v ¡ c)¡ F:(1)
As the value of ¯ increases, the positive/negative e®ect of an increase in v/c on ¼¤1 gets
stronger. The signi¯cance of each e®ect is ¯ (j@¼¤1=@vj = j@¼¤1=@cj = ¯).
The pro¯t of the buyer is
¼B1 = v ¡ To = (1¡ ¯)(v ¡ c):(2)
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III(i).2 Negotiation with one supplier and two buyers
Let us consider a case in which the supplier negotiates with two buyers. In this case,
we need to consider two possibilities. One is that each buyer pays not less than c, and
the other is that each buyer pays less than c and the sum of the payments of the two
buyers is greater than (1+a)c. In the ¯rst case, one unit of the good can be provided and
the buyer in the successful negotiation can obtain the good even if the other negotiation
breaks down. In this situation, the buyer is nonpivotal to the production of two units of
the good. In the other case, if one of the buyers withdraws from the negotiation, then
none of the goods are provided. In this situation, each buyer is pivotal to the provision of
the two units of the good (the term \pivotal" is used in Raskovich (2003)).
Nonpivotal buyers First, we consider a situation in which the two buyers are nonpiv-
otal to production; production is successful even if one of the buyers withdraws from the
negotiation. In this situation, the buyer and the supplier split the surplus v ¡ ac, where
the ¯rst (resp. the second) term is the additional bene¯t (resp. cost) from the trade given
that one trade will be executed. The buyer pays T to the supplier in a way that satis¯es
¯(v ¡ T ) = (1¡ ¯)(T ¡ ac) or T2n := ¯v + (1¡ ¯)ac:
The pro¯t of the supplier is
¼2n = 2T2n ¡ (1 + a)c¡ dF = 2¯v ¡ (1¡ (1¡ 2¯)a)c¡ dF:(3)
As the value of ¯ increases, the positive/negative e®ect of an increase in v/c on ¼2n
becomes stronger. The signi¯cance of the positive e®ect is 2¯ and that of the negative
e®ect is 1¡ (1¡ 2¯)a (j@¼2n=@vj = 2¯ and j@¼2n=@cj = 1¡ (1¡ 2¯)a).
The pro¯t of each buyer is
¼B2n = v ¡ T2n = (1¡ ¯)(v ¡ ac):(4)
Because the buyers are nonpivotal, we must have T2n ¡ c > 0. This is given as
¯v > (1¡ (1¡ ¯)a)c:
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Pivotal buyers Second, we consider a case in which every buyer is pivotal to production.
In this case, the production fails if one of the two buyers withdraws from the negotiation.
If T1 and T2 designate payments from buyers 1 and 2, respectively, the surplus of the
negotiation with buyer 1 is (v ¡ T1) + (T1 + T2 ¡ (1 + a)c) = v + T2 ¡ (1 + a)c and that
of the negotiation with buyer 2 is (v ¡ T2) + (T1 + T2 ¡ (1 + a)c) = v + T1 ¡ (1 + a)c. In
each equation, the terms in the ¯rst set of parentheses are the buyer's bene¯t from the
trade and those in the second set are the supplier's bene¯t from the trade, given that the
other trade will be executed. The buyers and the supplier split the surplus in a way that
satis¯es the following conditions:
¯(v ¡ T1) = (1¡ ¯)(T1 + T2 ¡ (1 + a)c); and
¯(v ¡ T2) = (1¡ ¯)(T1 + T2 ¡ (1 + a)c):
The simultaneous equations have only one solution: we obtain
T1 = T2 = T2p :=
¯v + (1¡ ¯)(1 + a)c
2¡ ¯ :
In the two negotiations, they take into account the total sum of the three players' bar-
gaining positions, ¯ + 2(1¡ ¯) = 2¡ ¯. The share of the supplier's bargaining position is
¯=(2¡ ¯). The coe±cient of v re°ects the share of the supplier.
The pro¯t of the supplier is
¼2p = 2T2p ¡ (1 + a)c¡ dF = ¯(2v ¡ (1 + a)c)2¡ ¯ ¡ dF:(5)
As the value of ¯ increases, the positive/negative e®ect of an increase in v/c on ¼2p becomes
stronger. The signi¯cance of the positive e®ect is 2¯=(2 ¡ ¯), and that of the negative
e®ect is (1 + a)¯=(2¡ ¯) (j@¼2p=@vj = 2¯=(2¡ ¯) and j@¼2p=@cj = (1 + a)¯=(2¡ ¯)).
The pro¯t of each buyer is
¼B2p = v ¡ T2p =
(1¡ ¯)(2v ¡ (1 + a)c)
2¡ ¯ :(6)
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Summary The pro¯ts of the supplier and each buyer are summarized as follows:
¼¤2 =
8>>><>>>:
¼2n = 2¯v ¡ (1¡ (1¡ 2¯)a)c¡ dF if c · ¯v1¡ (1¡ ¯)a;
¼2p =
¯(2v ¡ (1 + a)c)
2¡ ¯ ¡ dF if c ¸
¯v
1¡ (1¡ ¯)a:
(7)
¼B2 =
8>>><>>>:
¼B2n = (1¡ ¯)(v ¡ ac) if c ·
¯v
1¡ (1¡ ¯)a;
¼B2p =
(1¡ ¯)(2v ¡ (1 + a)c)
2¡ ¯ if c ¸
¯v
1¡ (1¡ ¯)a:
(8)
Note that when c = ¯v=(1¡ (1¡ ¯)a),
¼2n = ¼2p =
¯v(1¡ a)
1¡ (1¡ ¯)a ¡ dF and ¼
B
2n = ¼
B
2p =
(1¡ ¯)v(1¡ a)
1¡ (1¡ ¯)a :
III(ii) The ¯rst stage
We now consider the supplier's choice concerning the number of buyers. Suppose that the
supplier chooses the number to maximize its own pro¯t. Then, the supplier negotiates
with one buyer if and only if ¼¤1 > ¼¤2. >From (1) and (7), the di®erence between ¼¤1 and
¼¤2 is given as
¢¼¤ ´ ¼¤1 ¡ ¼¤2 =
8>>><>>>:
(d¡ 1)F ¡ ¯v + (1¡ ¯ ¡ (1¡ 2¯)a)c if c · ¯v
1¡ (1¡ ¯)a;
(d¡ 1)F ¡ ¯
2v + ¯(1¡ ¯ ¡ a)c
(2¡ ¯) if c ¸
¯v
1¡ (1¡ ¯)a:
(9)
Before we ascertain the properties of ¢¼¤, we must ¯rst ascertain whether there exists
F such that ¼¤1 > 0 and ¢¼¤ > 0.15 A simple rearrangement of (1) and (9) leads to the
following condition by which the supplier trades with only one buyer:
¯v ¡ (1¡ ¯ ¡ (1¡ 2¯)a)c
d¡ 1 < F < ¯(v ¡ c) if c ·
¯v
1¡ (1¡ ¯)a;
¯2v + ¯(1¡ ¯ ¡ a)c
(2¡ ¯)(d¡ 1) < F < ¯(v ¡ c) if c ¸
¯v
1¡ (1¡ ¯)a:
(10)
In (10), when the right-hand-side value of the second inequality is larger than the left-
hand-side value of the ¯rst inequality, there exists F such that ¼¤1 > 0 and ¢¼¤ > 0. This
15 If ¼¤1 · 0, the optimal number of buyers is not 1 even though ¢¼¤ > 0.
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condition is given as
d > d ´
8>>><>>>:
2¯v ¡ (1¡ (1¡ 2¯)a)c
¯(v ¡ c) if c ·
¯v
1¡ (1¡ ¯)a;
2v ¡ (1 + a)c
(2¡ ¯)(v ¡ c) if c ¸
¯v
1¡ (1¡ ¯)a:
(11)
We summarize this in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 If F satis¯es (10), then ¼¤1 > 0 and ¢¼¤ > 0. That is, the supplier prefers
trading with one buyer to trading with two buyers if F satis¯es (10).
We ¯rst exclude the case in which ¯ > 1=2 and concentrate our discussion on the case
in which ¯ · 1=2. This is because the inequality d > d in (11) is satis¯ed only if d > 2
when ¯ > 1=2.16
We now check the property of ¢¼¤. When ¯ · 1=2, the relations between ¢¼¤ and the
exogenous parameters are given as (the mathematical procedure is available in Appendix
1)
@¢¼¤
@a
< 0;
@¢¼¤
@c
> 0;
@¢¼¤
@¯
< 0; if c · ¯v
1¡ (1¡ ¯)a;
@¢¼¤
@a
> 0;
@¢¼¤
@c
< 0 i® 1 > a+ ¯;
@¢¼¤
@¯
< 0; if c ¸ ¯v
1¡ (1¡ ¯)a:
(12)
When the buyers are nonpivotal (c is small), an increase in a decreases ¢¼¤. As the
additional cost generated by the second production increases, the supplier tends to trade
with two buyers. This is because the supplier and one buyer take into account only the
additional cost ac, even though the supplier incurs the variable production cost (1 + a)c.
This means that the \uncompensated" production cost of the supplier is (1 + a)c¡ 2ac =
(1¡a)c. Because the uncompensated cost decreases as the value of a increases, the supplier
tends to trade with two buyers when the value of a is large. This tendency does not hold
when the buyers are pivotal (c is large). The buyers take into account the full cost (1+a)c
when they negotiate with the supplier. An increase in a only increases the additional
production cost when the supplier trades with the second buyer. Thus, the supplier tends
to trade with one buyer when the value of a is large.
16 When c = 0, d = 2. @d=@c > 0 for all c when ¯ > 1=2.
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When the buyers are nonpivotal (c is small), an increase in c increases ¢¼¤. The
\uncompensated" production cost of the supplier (1 ¡ a)c increases as the value of c
increases. This e®ect induces the supplier to trade with only one buyer.17 When the buyers
are pivotal (c is large), the e®ect of an increase in c on ¢¼¤ depends on the exogenous
values. We have already shown that j@¼¤1=@cj = ¯ and j@¼¤2p=@cj = (1 + a)¯=(2 ¡ ¯).
An increase in a increases the total production cost where the supplier trades with two
buyers, (1+a)c. Moreover, in general, a stronger bargaining position of the supplier leads
to greater gain and cost of the supplier from trade. In this context, the negative e®ect
of an increase in c strengthens with the bargaining position of the supplier. Because the
total production cost when the supplier trades with two buyers is larger than that when it
trades with one, the negative e®ect in the two-buyer case is also stronger than that with
one buyer. Because of those two e®ects, the sign of @¢¼¤=@c can be positive when ¯ and
a are su±ciently large (a+ ¯ > 1).
An increase in ¯ decreases ¢¼¤. As the bargaining power of the supplier increases,
the supplier tends to trade with two buyers. The bargaining power is positively correlated
with the gross gain of the supplier in the negotiation stage. A stronger bargaining power of
the supplier weakens the relative importance of the additional investment costs, (d¡ 1)F .
We brie°y discuss the relation between d and c. This is summarized in Figure 1.
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
cv
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
d
Β=110
Β=14
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
cv
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
d
Β=110
Β=14
(a = 0) (a = 3=4)
Figure 1: The optimal number of buyers can be one
Note: horizontal axis, c=v; vertical axis, d.
17 If a = 1, d in (11) is 2 for any c · v. That is, this e®ect disappears if a = 1.
14
d is minimized when c = ¯v=(1 ¡ (1 ¡ ¯)a), which is the threshold value regardless of
whether the buyers are pivotal. As mentioned above, the cost of the investments for
production is F (dF ) if the number of its negotiation partners is one (two), respectively,
where d 2 [1; 2]. The additional investment cost of the second round of production is
(d ¡ 1)F (· F ). This means that trading with two buyers is more pro¯table when d is
smaller.
This ¯gure shows an interesting property: nonmonotonicity of the relation between
the optimal number of buyers and c. This means that the supplier with a lower or higher
c prefers trading with two buyers, whereas one with an intermediate value of c prefers
trading with one buyer. The reason for this concerns the relation between ¢¼¤ and c,
which has been discussed above.
IV Quality choice
We incorporate quality investments into the basic setting. Between the ¯rst and the second
stages, the supplier invests to improve the (gross) value of each buyer for the good. In this
stage, if the supplier invests q ¸ 0 and has one (two) negotiation partners, the gross value
of each buyer becomes q and the cost of the investments is fq2 (dfq2), respectively, where
d 2 [1; 2] and f is a positive constant. That is, the supplier endogenously determines the
value for the good. Note that in the basic model, the supplier incurs the investment costs
F (dF ) when it trades with one buyer (two buyers), respectively. This investment cost is
assumed to be sunk; that is, the supplier cannot recover the cost in the second stage. We
employ this assumption in this section. The rest of the model assumptions are the same
as in the basic model.18
18 To simplify the analysis, we assume that product quality is common to both buyers. We only have
to consider two cases concerning buyers' positions: (i) they are pivotal; (ii) neither is pivotal. If we allow
heterogeneity of product quality, we have to consider the third case: (iii) one of the buyers is pivotal. The
additional case complicates the comparison of the three cases.
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IV(i) The negotiation stage
We use the same general mathematical procedures with the basic model. We replace the
gross value of each buyer by q and the investment cost by fq2 (dfq2) if the number of its
negotiation partners is one (two), respectively.
If the supplier decided to negotiate with one buyer, the pro¯t of the supplier is (see
(1))
¼1(q) = ¯(q ¡ c)¡ fq2:(13)
If the supplier decided to negotiate with two buyers, two situations can occur: (i) the
two buyers are nonpivotal to production; (ii) they are pivotal to production. If the buyers
are nonpivotal to production (¯q > (1¡ (1¡ ¯)a)c), the pro¯t of the supplier is (see (3))
¼2n(q) = 2¯q ¡ (1¡ (1¡ 2¯)a)c¡ dfq2:(14)
If both buyers are pivotal to production (¯q · (1¡ (1¡ ¯)a)c), the pro¯t of the supplier
is (see (5))
¼2p(q) =
¯(2q ¡ (1 + a)c)
2¡ ¯ ¡ dfq
2:(15)
IV(ii) The investment stage
We derive the optimal investment level q in the three situations.
If the supplier decided to negotiate with one buyer, the optimal q is given as (see (13))
q¤1 = argmaxq ¼1(q) =
¯
2f
:(16)
The optimal q¤1 leads to
¼1(q¤1) = ¯
µ
¯
4f
¡ c
¶
:(17)
The pro¯t of the buyer is (see (2))
¼B1 (q
¤
1) = (1¡ ¯)(q¤1 ¡ c) = (1¡ ¯)
µ
¯
2f
¡ c
¶
:(18)
If the supplier decides to negotiate with two buyers and they are nonpivotal to pro-
duction (¯q > (1¡ (1¡ ¯)a)c), the optimal q is given as (see (14))
q¤2n = argmaxq ¼2n(q) =
¯
df
:(19)
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The optimal q¤2n leads to
¼2n(q¤2n) =
¯2
df
¡ (1¡ (1¡ 2¯)a)c:(20)
The pro¯t of each buyer is (see (4))
¼B2n(q
¤
2n) = (1¡ ¯)(q¤2n ¡ ac) = (1¡ ¯)
µ
¯
df
¡ ac
¶
:(21)
q¤2n is an interior solution if and only if f < ¯2=(d(1¡ (1¡ ¯)a)c).
If the supplier decides to negotiate with two buyers and both are pivotal to production
(¯q · (1¡ (1¡ ¯)a)c), the optimal q is given as (see (15))
q¤2p = argmaxq ¼2p(q) =
¯
df(2¡ ¯) :(22)
The optimal q¤2p leads to
¼2p(q¤2p) =
¯
2¡ ¯
µ
¯
df(2¡ ¯) ¡ (1 + a)c
¶
:(23)
The pro¯t of each buyer is (see (6))
¼B2p(q
¤
2p) =
(1¡ ¯)(2q¤2p ¡ (1 + a)c)
2¡ ¯ =
1¡ ¯
2¡ ¯
µ
2¯
df(2¡ ¯) ¡ (1 + a)c
¶
:(24)
q¤2p is an interior solution if and only if f ¸ ¯2=(d(2¡ ¯)(1¡ (1¡ ¯)a)c).
Nonpivotal or pivotal For f 2 [¯2=(d(2¡ ¯)(1¡ (1¡ ¯)a)c); ¯2=(d(1¡ (1¡ ¯)a)c)),
the two cases in which the supplier trades with two buyers have interior solutions. In
other words, q¤2n and q¤2p are local optimal solutions for this range of f . q¤2p (q¤2n) is the
global optimum if and only if ¼2p(q¤2p) ¸ ¼2n(q¤2n) (¼2p(q¤2p) · ¼2n(q¤2n)), respectively.
¼2p(q¤2p) ¸ ¼2n(q¤2n) if and only if
f ¸ ¯
2(3¡ ¯)
2cd(2¡ ¯)(1¡ a+ a¯) 2
·
¯2
d(2¡ ¯)(1¡ (1¡ ¯)a)c ;
¯2
d(1¡ (1¡ ¯)a)c
¶
:
>From (20) and (23), if the supplier decides to negotiate with two buyers, the optimal
investment level q¤2 and the pro¯t of the supplier ¼2(q¤2) are
q¤2 =
8>>><>>>:
q¤2n =
¯
df
if f <
¯2(3¡ ¯)
2cd(2¡ ¯)(1¡ a+ a¯) ;
q¤2p =
¯
df(2¡ ¯) if f ¸
¯2(3¡ ¯)
2cd(2¡ ¯)(1¡ a+ a¯) ;
(25)
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¼2(q¤2) =
8>>><>>>:
¯2
df
¡ (1¡ (1¡ 2¯)a)c if f < ¯
2(3¡ ¯)
2cd(2¡ ¯)(1¡ a+ a¯) ;
¯
2¡ ¯
µ
¯
df(2¡ ¯) ¡ (1 + a)c
¶
if f ¸ ¯
2(3¡ ¯)
2cd(2¡ ¯)(1¡ a+ a¯) :
(26)
>From (16) and (25), we ¯nd how the number of buyers a®ects the equilibrium invest-
ment level.
Proposition 2 The investment level in the case of one buyer, q¤1, is larger than that in
the case of two buyers, q¤2, if and only if
d > 2=(2¡ ¯) and cdf ¸ ¯
2(3¡ ¯)
2(2¡ ¯)(1¡ a+ a¯) :
Now suppose that the supplier trades with two buyers that are pivotal. When the
investment level is q, following their bargaining positions, they split the total gain from
trade, 2q. A supplier and buyer pair i consider the gain from another trade between the
supplier and buyer j, Tj (i = 1; 2, j 6= i). As mentioned above, in the two negotiations
they consider the sum of the three players' bargaining positions, ¯ + 2(1 ¡ ¯) = 2 ¡ ¯.
The share of the supplier's bargaining position is ¯=(2 ¡ ¯). ¼2p(q) in (15) re°ects the
share of the supplier's bargaining position, and the total gross gain of the supplier from
the trades is 2q¯=(2 ¡ ¯) (see (15)). Note that this is smaller than that in which each
buyer is nonpivotal, 2¯q (see (14)). The smaller gross gain in the pivotal case diminishes
the incentive of the supplier to invest.
Proposition 2 implies that a narrow buyer-supplier relationship intensi¯es the sup-
plier's incentive to invest if the supplier's investment cost parameters c, d, and f are
large. As mentioned in the introduction, Japanese automakers and their suppliers are
more specialized than their US counterparts and there is a high correlation between sup-
plier specialization and automaker pro¯tability (Dyer (1996)). Although this statement
is based on the viewpoint of buyers (automakers), this correlation may occur because the
higher investment level caused by the narrower customer scope of suppliers leads to greater
pro¯tability of the automakers.
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IV(iii) The ¯rst stage
We need to ¯nd the highest value of f such that both ¼1(q¤1) and ¼2(q¤2) are positive. We
now impose the following assumption:
Assumption 1 We assume that a = 0 and f < ¯=4c.
We impose Assumption 1 to simplify the exposition and the analysis. The inequality in
Assumption 1 ensures that ¼1(q¤1) and ¼2(q¤2) are positive for the exogenous parameters
(¯, c, d, and f). >From (17) and (26), the di®erence between ¼1(q¤1) and ¼2(q¤2) is given
as19
¢¼(q¤) ´ ¼1(q¤1)¡ ¼2(q¤2)
=
8>>><>>>:
4cd(1¡ ¯)f ¡ ¯2(4¡ d)
4df
if f <
¯2(3¡ ¯)
2cd(2¡ ¯) ;
¯(¯((2¡ ¯)2d¡ 4)¡ 4cd(2¡ ¯)(1¡ ¯)f)
4(2¡ ¯)2df if f ¸
¯2(3¡ ¯)
2cd(2¡ ¯) :
If the following condition holds, ¢¼(q¤) > 0:
¯2(4¡ d)
4cd(1¡ ¯) < f <
¯((2¡ ¯)2d¡ 4)
4cd(2¡ ¯)(1¡ ¯) :(27)
Depending on the exogenous parameters, f can be empty. If the right-hand-side value in
the latter inequality is larger than the left-hand-side value in the former inequality, there
exists f such that ¢¼(q¤) > 0. The following inequality shows the condition in which the
optimal number of buyers may be one. The right-hand side is increasing in ¯.
d >
2(1 + 2¯ ¡ ¯2)
2¡ ¯ :(28)
We summarize the above discussion in the following proposition:
Proposition 3 Under Assumption 1, if f satis¯es (27), then ¼1(q¤1) > 0 and ¢¼(q¤) > 0.
That is, the supplier prefers trading with one buyer to trading with two buyers if f satis¯es
(27).
19 Note that ¯2(3 ¡ ¯)=2cd(2 ¡ ¯) is not always smaller than ¯=4c in Assumption 1. That is, in some
cases, only the nonpivotal case appears.
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The relations between ¢¼(q¤) and the exogenous parameters are given as (the math-
ematical procedure is available in Appendix 1)
@¢¼(q¤)
@c
> 0;
@¢¼(q¤)
@¯
< 0; if f · ¯
2(3¡ ¯)
2cd(2¡ ¯) ;
@¢¼(q¤)
@c
< 0;
@¢¼(q¤)
@¯
>
< 0 if d >< ~d if f ¸ ¯
2(3¡ ¯)
2cd(2¡ ¯) ;
(29)
where ~d ´ 8¯=((2¡¯)(¯(2¡¯)2¡ 2(2¡ 4¯+¯2)cf)).20 Essentially, ¢¼(q¤) has a similar
property to ¢¼¤. The property of @¢¼(q¤)=@¯ is di®erent from that of @¢¼¤=@¯ when
the buyers are pivotal. In particular, when d > 16=((2¡¯)(6¡4¯+¯2)) and the buyers are
pivotal, @¢¼(q¤)=@¯ > 0 for any f under Assumption 1. As in Proposition 2, when d and
f are large, the equilibrium investment level is larger when the supplier trades with one
buyer (q¤1 > q¤2). This property is quite di®erent from that in the case where the quality
of goods is exogenous. When d and f are large, the stronger bargaining position of the
supplier generates a greater gross gain from trade when it trades with one buyer rather
than two. Because a larger value of d enhances the di®erence between the equilibrium
investment levels q¤1 ¡ q¤2, a stronger bargaining position for the supplier can encourage it
to decrease the number of buyers when d is large.
V Buyer merger
We brie°y discuss whether the buyers have an incentive to merge.
If the supplier decides to negotiate with a merged buyer, then the surplus of this
negotiation is 2v¡ (1 + a)c. Let T denote a payment from the buyer to the supplier. The
buyer and the supplier split the surplus in a way that satis¯es 2v ¡ T : T ¡ (1 + a)c =
1¡ ¯ : ¯. Therefore, we obtain
¯[2v ¡ T ] = (1¡ ¯)(T ¡ (1 + a)c) or Tm := 2¯v + (1¡ ¯)(1 + a)c:
Then, the pro¯t of the supplier is
¼¤m = Tm ¡ (1 + a)c¡ dF = ¯(2v ¡ (1 + a)c)¡ dF:(30)
20 The denominator is positive under Assumption 1.
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The pro¯t of the buyer is
¼Bm = 2v ¡ Tm = (1¡ ¯)(2v ¡ (1 + a)c):(31)
If ¼Bm is larger than 2¼
B
2 (see (8) and (31)), the buyers merge. We easily ¯nd that the buyers
merge if and only if they are pivotal. The di®erence between ¼¤m and ¼¤1 is positive.21
When the supplier invests to improve its product quality, q, the pro¯t of the supplier
is
¼m(q) = ¯(2q ¡ (1 + a)c)¡ dfq2:(32)
>From (32), the investment level is given as
q¤m = argmaxq ¼m(q) =
¯
df
:(33)
The optimal investment level q¤m leads to
¼m(q¤m) =
¯2
df
¡ ¯(1 + a)c:(34)
The pro¯t of the merged buyer is
¼Bm(q
¤
m) = (1¡ ¯)(2q¤m ¡ (1 + a)c) = (1¡ ¯)
µ
2¯
df
¡ (1 + a)c
¶
:(35)
If ¼Bm(q
¤
m) is larger than 2¼
B
2 (q
¤
2) (see (26) and (35)), the buyers merge. We easily ¯nd
that the buyers merge if and only if they are pivotal. The di®erence between ¼m(q¤m) and
¼1(q¤1) is positive.22
21 The di®erence is given by
¼¤1 ¡ ¼¤m = (d¡ 1)F ¡ ¯(v ¡ ac) < (d¡ 1)¯(v ¡ c)¡ ¯(v ¡ ac)
= ¡¯(2v ¡ (1 + a)c¡ (v ¡ c)d) · ¡¯(2v ¡ (1 + a)c¡ 2(v ¡ c))
= ¡¯(1¡ a)c · 0:
22 The di®erence is given by
¼1(q
¤
1)¡ ¼m(q¤m) = ¯

ac¡ ¯(4¡ d)
4df

· ¯

c¡ ¯(4¡ d)
4df

< ¯

¯
4f
¡ ¯(4¡ d)
4df

=
¯2(2d¡ 4)
4df
· 0:
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Based on the model in Raskovich (2003), Adilov and Alexander (2006) and Clark et
al. (2008) also discuss buyer mergers. They clarify how being a pivotal merged buyer
a®ects the payo®s of the players. Adilov and Alexander (2006) focus on heterogeneity
of bargaining power among buyers, and Clark et al. (2008) consider several cases in
which players sequentially bargain as in Stole and Zwiebel (1996a). Their basic results are
consistent with ours.
VI Decision on the number of trading partners: Buyer's
decision
So far, we have considered several cases in which the supplier determines the number of
buyers. We now consider two cases in which a buyer determines the number of buyers. The
only di®erence between the analysis in this section and that in the previous section is the
structure of the ¯rst stage. The number of trading partners is determined by the current
buyer in this section. The discussion is motivated by the following situation. A potential
buyer emerges when a buyer and a supplier trade exclusively with each other. It is not
obvious whether or not expanding the number of buyers bene¯ts the incumbent buyer. If
the expansion harms the incumbent buyer and if the contract between the pair allows this
buyer to prevent the supplier from increasing the number of buyers, the incumbent buyer
does not allow the supplier to do so.23
The model setting in this section is related to Nobeoka (1996). Focusing on the sourcing
concentration and the sharing of common suppliers with competitors, he examines the
component sourcing strategy of the Japanese automobile manufacturers. In his paper, he
proposes two strategic dimensions in component sourcing. One of the dimensions is the
degree of supplier sharing with competing assemblers. Some assemblers may buy a certain
type of component from a supplier that exclusively sells it to the manufacturer, while others
23 In the introduction, we mention the case in which a±liated ¯rms in the Toyota keiretsu group sold a
portion of their products to outsiders. This case may be taken as an example of the buyer deciding the
number of trading partners served by the supplier. If Toyota has an exclusive contract with its a±liated
¯rms, then the a±liated ¯rms cannot trade with a new partner without its permission. In that situation,
Toyota's permission implies that the a±liated ¯rms can expand their number of trading partners.
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may rely on a supplier that sells the same type of component to other manufacturers as
well.24
We now consider the buyer's choice concerning the number of buyers. Suppose that
the buyer chooses the number to maximize its own pro¯t. From (2) and (8), the number
is one if and only if
¼B1 = (1¡ ¯)(v ¡ c) ¸ ¼B2 =
8>><>>:
(1¡ ¯)(v ¡ ac) if c · ¯v
1¡ (1¡ ¯)a:
(1¡ ¯)(2v ¡ (1 + a)c)
2¡ ¯ if c ¸
¯v
1¡ (1¡ ¯)a:
We easily ¯nd that the inequality does not hold for all exogenous parameters (note that
c · v). That is, the current buyer always prefers to expand the customer scope of the
supplier. We next show that this result changes when we incorporate quality investments
into the basic model.
We now consider the case with quality investments. The only di®erence between the
analysis in this and the previous part is the structure of the ¯rst stage. To simplify the
analysis, we impose Assumption 1 in this case.
First, we easily ¯nd that ¼B2n(q
¤
2n) > ¼
B
1 (q
¤
1) (see (18) and (21)). This means that the
optimal number of buyers is two for the current buyer when f < ¯2(3¡ ¯)=(2cd(2¡ ¯)).
Second, the di®erence between ¼B1 (q
¤
1) and ¼
B
2p(q
¤
2p) is given as (see (18) and (24))
¢¼B(q¤) ´ ¼B1 (q¤1)¡ ¼B2p(q¤2p) =
(1¡ ¯)(¯((2¡ ¯)2d¡ 4)¡ 2cd(2¡ ¯)(1¡ ¯)f)
2df(2¡ ¯)2 :
This is positive if and only if
¯2(3¡ ¯)
2cd(2¡ ¯) · f <
¯((2¡ ¯)2d¡ 4)
2cd(2¡ ¯)(1¡ ¯) :(36)
Note that the ¯rst inequality is the condition under which the supplier chooses q¤2p in
the investment stage. Depending on the exogenous parameters, f can be empty. If the
right-hand-side value in the second inequality is larger than the left-hand-side value in the
24 The other dimension is the sourcing concentration that determines the degree of reliance on a small
number of suppliers such as on a single supplier. This dimension is similar in concept to the number of
suppliers from which a ¯rm procure a certain type of components.
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¯rst inequality, there exists f such that ¼B1 (q
¤
1) > ¼
B
2p(q
¤
2p). The following inequality shows
the condition under which the optimal number of buyers can be one. The right-hand side
is increasing in ¯.
d >
4 + 3¯ ¡ 4¯2 + ¯3
(2¡ ¯)2 :(37)
We summarize the above discussion in the following proposition:
Proposition 4 Suppose that the supplier engages in quality investment. Under Assump-
tion 1, when a current buyer determines the number of buyers, the optimal number of
buyers is one for the current buyer if f satis¯es (36).
This result is also related to Proposition 2. When the supplier trades with two buyers,
the equilibrium quality becomes lower, although per-unit production cost is reduced. A
broad customer scope strategy is not preferable for the supplier and the current buyer if
the investment technology of the supplier is not good (f and d are large).
Our result may have a potential to explain the di®erence among the sourcing strate-
gies of major Japanese automobile assemblers. Nobeoka (1996) investigates the sourcing
strategy of six Japanese car assemblers (Toyota, Nissan, Honda, Mitsubishi, Mazda, and
Suzuki) regarding 95 components. He classi¯es two types of sourcing strategy into the
quasi-market strategy and the quasi-hierarchy strategy. The former is related to an ex-
pansion of the supplier's customer scope and the latter is related to an exclusive trade
relation. He shows that Nissan and Honda employ the quasi-hierarchy strategy while Toy-
ota, Mitsubishi, and Suzuki do the quasi-market strategy. He also shows that ¯rms using
a broad manufacturer-supplier network tend to be more pro¯table. Our result clari¯es
the condition that ¯rms using a broad manufacturer-supplier network are more pro¯table.
Our result implies that a broad customer scope strategy is employed by the supplier and
the current buyer when the supplier has a good investment technology (f and d are small).
As a result, in our model, a broad manufacturer-supplier network leads to superior per-
formance. Our result may be consistent with the ¯nding in Nobeoka (1996).
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VII Concluding remarks
We provide a simple model and investigate what factors determine the number of trading
partners. We show several results that may be consistent with the formation of Japanese
buyer-supplier relations. When the supplier is able to determine the number of trading
partners, one or two, the optimal number is one for the supplier if the supplier's bargaining
power with its trading partners is weak and the supplier's additional sunk investment cost
is relatively large. The supplier prefers to trade with one buyer if the variable production
cost is neither large nor small for the value of the good. That is, there is nonmonotonicity
in the relation between the optimal number of buyers and the variable production cost.
This means that a supplier with a lower or higher cost prefers trading with two buyers,
whereas one with an intermediate level of variable production cost prefers trading with
one buyer. We also show that the equilibrium investment level when the supplier trades
with one buyer can be larger than that with two buyers if the sunk investment cost is
large relative to the value of the good, the supplier's bargaining power with its trading
partners is weak, and the variable production cost is large. This may be related to the
following ¯nding. Japanese automakers and their suppliers are more specialized than
their US counterparts and there is a high correlation between supplier specialization and
automaker pro¯tability (Dyer (1996)). Although this statement is based on the viewpoint
of buyers (automakers), this correlation may occur because the higher investment level
caused by the narrower customer scope of suppliers leads to greater pro¯tability of the
automakers.
Our model may be applicable to the cable television industry. As mentioned in Chipty
and Snyder (1999), a program service provider (supplier) has bilateral relationships with
cable operators (buyers). Those operators tend to be regional monopolists and do not
compete with each other. To make TV programs, such a program service company must
incur higher (sunk) costs. In some cases, the program service company may have to pay
per-buyer copyright fees for artists who participate in these TV programs (this is related
to variable costs of the supplier). In other cases, this company would not have to do so
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because its own sta® members make its programs. When we apply our results to this
industry, we can say that a program service provider (supplier) that has to incur higher
¯xed costs and relatively higher variable costs should have a narrow relationship with
cable operators.
In our model, buyers are independent in their ¯nal product markets. As discussed
in Matsushima (2004, 2009), competition among buyers is an important research topic.
To simplify the analysis of our model, we consider the transactions of only one supplier.
Markets with multiple suppliers are also an important research topic. The wider inves-
tigation allows us to discuss competition among suppliers, although this complicates the
analysis. Moreover, the topic of repeated interactions between suppliers and buyers is im-
portant. This would arise in examining the reason why technological improvements induce
the gradual decrease of trading prices over time in Japanese buyer{supplier relationships.
These are signi¯cant topics for future research.
Appendix 1: comparative statics
We now explain the results concerning the comparative statics of ¢¼¤ and ¢¼(q¤).
When ¯ < 1=2 and c · ¯v=(1 ¡ (1 ¡ ¯)a) (the buyers are non-pivotal), we have the
following result:
@¢¼¤
@a
= ¡(1¡ 2¯)c < 0;
@¢¼¤
@c
= (1¡ ¯ ¡ (1¡ 2¯)a) > 0;
@¢¼¤
@¯
= ¡v ¡ (1¡ 2a)c · 0:
Note that (1 ¡ ¯ ¡ (1 ¡ 2¯)a) = 1 ¡ ¯ > 0 when a = 0 and (1¡ ¯ ¡ (1¡ 2¯)a) = ¯ > 0
when a = 1. Therefore, for any a 2 [0; 1], (1 ¡ ¯ ¡ (1 ¡ 2¯)a) is positive. Note also that
¡v¡(1¡2a)c = ¡v < 0 when c = 0 and ¡v¡(1¡2a)c = ¡(1+¯)(1¡a)v=(1¡(1¡¯)a) · 0
when c = ¯v=(1¡ (1¡ ¯)a). Therefore, for any c 2 [0; ¯v=(1¡ (1¡ ¯)a)], ¡v ¡ (1¡ 2a)c
is non positive.
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When ¯ < 1=2 and c ¸ ¯v=(1¡(1¡¯)a) (the buyers are pivotal), we have the following
result:
@¢¼¤
@a
=
¯c
2¡ ¯ > 0;
@¢¼¤
@c
= ¡1¡ ¯ ¡ a
2¡ ¯ < 0 i® 1 > a+ ¯;
@¢¼¤
@¯
= ¡2(1¡ a)c+ ¯(4¡ ¯)(v ¡ c)
(2¡ ¯)2 < 0:
When ¯ < 1=2 and f · ¯2(3¡ ¯)=(2cd(2¡ ¯)) (the buyers are non-pivotal), we have
the following result:
@¢¼¤
@c
=
4d(1¡ ¯)f
4df
> 0;
@¢¼¤
@¯
= ¡2cdf + ¯(4¡ d)
2df
< 0:
When ¯ < 1=2 and f ¸ ¯2(3 ¡ ¯)=(2cd(2 ¡ ¯)) (the buyers are pivotal), we have the
following result:
@¢¼¤
@c
= ¡4d(2¡ ¯)(1¡ ¯)f
4(2¡ ¯)2df < 0;
@¢¼¤
@¯
=
¯(d(2¡ ¯)3 ¡ 8)¡ 2cd(2¡ ¯)(2¡ 4¯ + ¯2)f
2(2¡ ¯)2df :
Appendix 2: sequential bargaining
We present two sorts of sequential bargaining models. In the ¯rst model, the supplier
negotiates with buyers bilaterally and sequentially. In the second model, the supplier and
the buyers participate in the bargaining modeled through the Shapley value.
A sequential bilateral bargaining
We ¯rst consider the following sequential bargaining (see Stole and Zwiebel (1996a, b)):
First, the ¯rst buyer negotiates with the supplier. If the negotiation reaches an agreement,
the buyer's payment T1 is determined; otherwise, no transfer occurs and the buyer exits
the game. Observing the outcome of the negotiation, the second buyer negotiates with the
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supplier. If the negotiation reaches an agreement, the buyer's payment T2 is determined;
otherwise, no transfer occurs and the buyer exits the game.25
We ¯rst analyze bargaining between the second buyer and the supplier. Given the
outcome of the bargaining, we then examine the bargaining among the ¯rst buyer and the
supplier.
Given that the ¯rst buyer's payment T1 is determined, we consider the negotiation
between the second buyer and the supplier. We need to consider the following two cases:
one is the case of T1 > c (the second buyer is non-pivotal) and the other is the case of
T1 · c (the second buyer is pivotal).
Case 1. T1 > c. When T1 > c, the second buyer is non-pivotal. The additional surplus
of the trade with the second buyer is v ¡ ac. The second buyer pays T2 to the supplier in
a way that satis¯es
¯(v ¡ T2) = (1¡ ¯)(T2 ¡ ac) or T2 = ¯v + (1¡ ¯)ac:
Assuming that the second negotiation reaches the agreement mentioned above, the ¯rst
buyer negotiates with the supplier. It is worth noting that T2 > c holds if and only
if the ¯rst buyer is also non-pivotal.26 Because T2 > c implies ¯v > (1 ¡ (1 ¡ ¯)a)c,
¯v > (1¡ (1¡ ¯)a)c must be satis¯ed for the ¯rst buyer to be non-pivotal.
(1.1) If ¯v > (1¡ (1¡¯)a)c, the ¯rst buyer is non-pivotal and then the additional surplus
of the trade with the ¯rst buyer is v¡ ac. The ¯rst buyer pays T1 to the supplier in
a way that satis¯es
¯(v ¡ T1) = (1¡ ¯)T1 ¡ ac or T1 = T2 = ¯v + (1¡ ¯)ac:
This satis¯es the condition that T1 > c if and only if
¯v > (1¡ (1¡ ¯)a)c:
25 The order of bargaining does not a®ect our result.
26 If T2 · c, then it depends on the value of T1 whether two units of input are supplied by the supplier.
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(1.2) If ¯v · (1¡ (1¡ ¯)a)c, then the ¯rst buyer is pivotal and the additional surplus of
the trade with the ¯rst buyer is (v ¡ T1) + (T1 + T2 ¡ (1 + a)c) = v + T2 ¡ (1 + a)c.
The ¯rst buyer pays T1 to the supplier in a way that satis¯es
¯(v ¡ T1) = (1¡ ¯)(T1 + T2 ¡ (1 + a)c) or T1 = ¯2v + (1¡ ¯)(1 + a¯)c:
This satis¯es the condition that T1 > c if and only if
¯v > (1¡ (1¡ ¯)a)c:
However, since we now consider the case in ¯v · (1¡ (1¡¯)a)c, case (1.2) does not
appear in equilibrium.
If ¯v > (1 ¡ (1 ¡ ¯)a)c, then T1 > c is supported as an equilibrium and then T1 = T2 =
¯v + (1¡ ¯)ac:
Case 2. T1 · c. When T1 · c, the second buyer is pivotal. The additional surplus of
the trade with the second buyer is (v¡T2)+ (T1+T2¡ (a+1)c) = v+T1¡ (a+1)c. The
second buyer pays T2 to the supplier in a way that satis¯es
¯(v ¡ T2) = (1¡ ¯)(T1 + T2 ¡ (a+ 1)c) or T2 = ¯v + (1¡ ¯)(a+ 1)c¡ (1¡ ¯)T1:(38)
Assuming that the second negotiation reaches the agreement mentioned above, the ¯rst
buyer negotiates with the supplier.
(2.1) If T2 > c, then the ¯rst buyer is non-pivotal and the additional surplus of the trade
with the ¯rst buyer is v ¡ ac. The ¯rst buyer pays T1 to the supplier in a way that
satis¯es
¯(v ¡ T1) = (1¡ ¯)(T1 ¡ ac) or T1 = ¯v + (1¡ ¯)ac:
Substituting it into T2 in (38), we obtain
T1 = ¯v + (1¡ ¯)ac; T2 = ¯2v + (1¡ ¯)(1 + ¯a)c:
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This satis¯es the condition that T1 · c if and only if
¯v · (1¡ (1¡ ¯)a)c:(39)
We obtain T2 > c if and only if
¯v > (1¡ (1¡ ¯)a)c:(40)
There is no exogenous values that satisfy the two inequalities. Therefore, case (2.1)
does not appear in equilibrium.
(2.2) If T2 · c, then the ¯rst buyer is pivotal and the additional surplus of the trade with
the ¯rst buyer is (v ¡ T1) + (T1 + T2 ¡ (a + 1)c) = v + T2 ¡ (a + 1)c. The ¯rst
buyer pays T1 to the supplier in a way that satis¯es (we substitute T2 in (38) into
the following equation)
¯(v ¡ T1) = (1¡ ¯)(T1 + T2 ¡ (a+ 1)c) = ¯(1¡ ¯)(v + T1 ¡ (a+ 1)c):
The equation leads to
T1 = T2 =
¯v + (1¡ ¯)(a+ 1)c
2¡ ¯ :
This satis¯es the condition that T1 · c if and only if ¯v · (1¡ (1¡¯)a)c and T2 · c
if and only if ¯v · (1¡ (1¡ ¯)a)c:
If ¯v · (1 ¡ (1 ¡ ¯)a)c, then T1 · c is supported as an equilibrium and then T1 = T2 =
(¯v + (1¡ ¯)(a+ 1)c)=(2¡ ¯):
We can summarize the results mentioned above as follows:
T1 = T2 =
8><>:
¯v + (1¡ ¯)ac if ¯v > (1¡ (1¡ ¯)a)c,
¯v + (1¡ ¯)(a+ 1)c
2¡ ¯ if ¯v · (1¡ (1¡ ¯)a)c.
(41)
These transfer payments by the buyers are equal to those derived in the main text.
Appendix 3: a sequential bargaining modeled through the Shapley value
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We consider the bargaining modeled through the Shapley value. Each player comes
to negotiate in a given order and receives the marginal surplus from his/her arrival. The
marginal surplus of the arrival may depend on the order of arrival, which is stochastically
determined. We assume that the probability of each arrival order is the same. The Shapley
value of each player is their expected marginal surplus. By applying the Shapley value,
we calculate each player's share of the bargaining surplus.
We ¯rst examine the case in which the supplier negotiates with two buyers. Because
there are three players (the supplier, buyer 1, and buyer 2), there are 3! = 6 orders.
Each order occurs with probability 1/6. The bargaining surplus is calculated from a
characteristic function. A natural characteristic function of our model, denoted by V 2 :
fS;B1; B2g ! R+, in which S, B1, and B2 represent the supplier, buyer 1, and buyer 2,
respectively, is as follows. We normalize V 2(;) = 0. No one can gain by him/herself; hence,
V 2(i) = 0 for each i 2 fS;B1; B2g. B1 and B2 can earn nothing; hence, V 2(B1; B2) = 0.
Groups of the supplier and at least one buyer generate a surplus; V 2(S;B1) = V 2(S;B2) =
v¡ c and V 2(S;B1; B2) = 2v¡ (1+ a)c. The marginal contribution of player i to a set of
arrived players, S0, such that i =2 S0 is given by V 2(S0 [ fig)¡ V 2(S0).
The expected contribution of player i constitutes the Shapley value, SV 2i (i 2 fS;B1; B2g).
Buyer 1's expected contribution, SV 2B1, is
SV 2B1 =
V 2(B1)¡ V 2(;)
6
+
V 2(B1)¡ V 2(;)
6
+
V 2(B1; B2)¡ V 2(B2)
6
+
V 2(S;B1)¡ V 2(S)
6
+
V 2(S;B1; B2)¡ V 2(S;B2)
6
+
V 2(S;B1; B2)¡ V 2(S;B2)
6
=
3v ¡ c¡ 2ac
6
:
By a similar calculation, the expected contribution of B2, SV 2B2, and that of S, SV
2
S , are
SV 2B2 = (3v ¡ c¡ 2ac)=6 and SV 2S = (3v ¡ (1 + a)c¡ c)=3, respectively.27
Second, we examine the case in which the supplier negotiates with one buyer. Consider
a situation in which the supplier negotiates with buyer Bi (i = 1; 2). We can similarly
27 Note that SV 2S + SV
2
B1 + SV
2
B2 = V
2(S;B1; B2).
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introduce a characteristic function V 1 : fS;Big ! R+: V 1(;) = 0, V 1(j) = 0 for each
j 2 fS;Big, and V 1(S;Bi) = v¡ c. The expected contribution of S, SV 1S , and that of Bi,
SV 1Bi, are SV
1
S = (v ¡ c)=2 and SV 1Bi = (v ¡ c)=2, respectively.
Based on these analyses, we examine the optimal number of buyers with whom the
supplier negotiates. When the supplier negotiates with one buyer, his/her payo® is
¼¤1 ´ SV 1S ¡ F =
v ¡ c
2
¡ F:(42)
When he/she trades with two buyers, his/her payo® is
¼¤2 ´ SV 2S ¡ dF =
3v ¡ (1 + a)c¡ c
3
¡ dF:(43)
Subtracting (43) from (42) yields
¼¤1 ¡ ¼¤2 =
¡3v ¡ c+ 2(1 + a)c
6
+ (d¡ 1)F:(44)
We examine whether there is an exogenous parameter in which the supplier chooses to
trade with one buyer. The supplier chooses to trade with one buyer if and only if ¼¤1¡¼¤2 ¸
0 and ¼¤1 ¸ 0. We have
¼¤1 ¡ ¼¤2 ¸ 0 if and only if F ¸
3v + c¡ 2(1 + a)
6(d¡ 1)
and
¼¤1 ¸ 0 if and only if
v ¡ c
2
¸ F:
Thus,
v ¡ c
2
¸ F ¸ 3v + c¡ 2(1 + a)c
6(d¡ 1) :(45)
We show that there exists an exogenous parameter that satis¯es (45).
Lemma 1 Condition (45) holds if and only if a = 1 and d = 2.
Proof. Su±ciency is trivial. We show its necessity. We suppose that either a 6= 1 or
d 6= 2. The left-hand side of (45) minus the right-hand side of (45) is equal to
3(d¡ 2)v ¡ (3d¡ 2)c+ 2(1 + a)c
6(d¡ 1) :(46)
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Because v > c, we can describe v = °c for some ° > 1. Substituting v = °c into (46), we
obtain
(3(d¡ 2)° ¡ (3d¡ 2) + 2(1 + a))c
6(d¡ 1) :(47)
Because ° > 1 and d · 2,
(3(d¡ 2)° ¡ (3d¡ 2) + 2(1 + a))c
6(d¡ 1) ·
(3(d¡ 2)¡ (3d¡ 2) + 2(1 + a))c
6(d¡ 1) :(48)
If d = 2 but not a = 1, the right-hand side of (48) is (a ¡ 1)c=3, which is negative. If
a = 1 but not d = 2, then (48) holds with strict inequality and the right-hand side of (48)
is zero. Thus, there is no exogenous parameter that satis¯es (45) in either case. ¥
By Lemma 1, if there exists an exogenous parameter at which the supplier chooses to
trade with one buyer, then a = 1 and d = 2. However, when a = 1 and d = 2, the supplier
is indi®erent between trade with two buyers and trade with one buyer. No parameter
supports the supplier (strictly) preferring trade with one buyer to trade with two buyers.
Therefore, in bargaining based on the Shapley value, the supplier rarely trades with one
buyer.
We examine the merger incentive of buyers. Suppose that B1 and B2 merge. The
merged buyer is denoted by B12. In this situation, a characteristic function V m :
fS;B12g ! R+ is as follows: V m(;) = V m(S) = V m(B12) = 0 and V m(S;B12) =
2v¡ (1+ a)c. In the Shapley value, S receives SV mS = (2v¡ (1+ a)c)=2 and B12 receives
SV mB12 = (2v ¡ (1 + a)c)=2. The buyers merge if and only if SV mB12 ¸ SV 2B1 + SV 2B2. We
obtain SV mB12 ¡ (SV 2B1 + SV 2B2) = c(a ¡ 1)=6 · 0. Thus, in bargaining modeled by the
Shapley value, the merger does not bene¯t the buyers.
In the Shapley value, the probability of each order is the same. This re°ects the fact
that the supplier and the buyers are treated symmetrically and the players have the same
bargaining power.28 One of the ways to investigate the e®ect of asymmetric bargaining
power, introduced in simultaneous bargaining, is to assign di®erent probabilities to the
28 There are similarities between the Shapley value analysis and the simultaneous bargaining analysis
with ¯ = 1=2. In the case of the simultaneous bargaining analysis with ¯ = 1=2, d ¸ 2. This means that
a trade with one buyer rarely occurs in equilibrium.
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order of the three players. In our game, as you can see in the characteristics functions,
the marginal contribution of a player increases as he/she comes to the negotiation later.
If we interpret this to mean that a higher marginal contribution entails greater bargaining
power, then we can represent bargaining power by order of players. If the supplier has
relatively strong bargaining power, the probability that the supplier arrives in the third
place is relatively high and vice versa. If the supplier arrives in third place, he/she can
extract the entire surplus. Thus, if the supplier negotiates with two buyers and if the
probability that the supplier is the third arriver is su±ciently low, the supplier's payo®
in the case of one buyer may be greater than his/her payo® in the case of two buyers.
Asymmetric treatment of the order may create the possibility that the supplier bene¯ts
from trading with two buyers and that the buyers bene¯t from merging.
Stole and Zwiebel (1996a, b) introduce a sequential and bilateral bargaining model.
They examine intra¯rm wage bargaining between an employer and employees. They do
not examine a buyer{supplier network. Unlike our sequential bargaining model, Stole and
Zwiebel (1996a, b) assume that contracts between players are nonbinding and players can
renegotiate contract details. They show that the equilibrium outcome of the sequential
bargaining with renegotiation coincides with the Shapley value. Clarke et al. (2008) and
Jeon (2006) apply the Shapley value to the buyer{supplier network and analyze the merger
incentive of players. They do not examine the optimal number of buyers. Shapley (1953)
and Kalai and Samet (1987) introduce a generalization of the Shapley value. In the gen-
eralized Shapley value, the order of players' arrival is treated asymmetrically. Application
of the generalized Shapley value may change our result above.
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